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China's growing economic power combined with emerging Asian community is not only 
gradually enabling Asia to be one of the most important economic regions in the world, but also 
changing the international structure that was largely dominated by the United States since the 
end of World War II. China's participation in ASEAN is the most important institutional 
organization in Southeast Asian cooperation and a critical arena for China to engage Southeast 
Asian countries. This has aroused the attention of many scholars. Is China's regional foreign 
policy behavior becoming more cooperative and inclusive through the socialization influence of 
ASEAN participation? Or is China using ASEAN to extend its influence and dominate the Asian 
region? This debate mainly takes place between realist and constructivist. In fact, there is a sharp 
division among these scholars regarding China's foreign policy intent in Southeast Asian region. 
The China-ASEAN relationship is   
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Part I: Introduction 
China’s rise along with the economic integration of Asia has aroused suspicions about 
whether the Chinese leadership seeks economic and military hegemony in the region.  
For instance, East Asia, as the third largest economic region (following North America 
and EU), has 29 percent of the world’s population and produces about 19 percent of 
global GDP in 2005 (Saunders 2008, 129). China is an economic engine fueling East 
Asian economy, especially after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. In the wake of the 
Financial Crisis, China as well as South Korea, and Japan participated in Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as ASEAN Plus Three (APT). This was a landmark 
event for East Asian economic integration and has increased trade relations between 
China and ASEAN.  For example, in 2005, ASEAN-China bilateral trade grew 15 times 
larger than the 1991 figures1. Furthermore, China and ASEAN signed an agreement in 
2004 that created the largest free trade zone – China-ASEAN free trade area (CAFTA) in 
the world in 2010. Obviously, China’s economic influence is increasing dramatically in 
Southeast Asia. 
Not only is China’s economic influence accelerating Southeast Asian regionalism, but 
China’s political and military strength has altered the perception of the regional order for 
                                                      
1 See China-ASEAN summit to focus on regional trade, political trust 2006. 
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other Asian countries as well as the U.S. Indeed, it is difficult for China to play a 
reconciliation role in Asia without antagonizing the U.S. or destabilizing the regional 
order (Saunders 2008, 131). Even though ASEAN states welcome China in order to fuel 
economic growth in this region, they still worry about China’s growing military force and 
political clout that can marginalize their international status. Specifically, many Asian 
states are concerned with People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) military technology 
acquisitions (Swaine 2005, 273). Therefore, while ASEAN enjoys the economic benefit 
of China’s participation, ASEAN also tries to decrease China’s military threat by 
integrating China into the regional security systems (Swaine 2005, 274). Whether 
ASEAN has successfully socialized China through its norms and economic cooperation 
or China is just using ASEAN to expand its influence in Southeast Asia is still a question 
within the debate.  
 
The state of the previous work and unresolved problems 
Realism 
The debate regarding to whether China’s participation in ASEAN reflects a socialized 
China or a China seeking greater regional dominance mainly takes place between realists 
and constructivists (Acharya & Stubbs 2006; Peou 2002), while neoliberal 
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institutionalism is considered a theory with less explanatory power after 1997 Asian 
financial crisis (Acharya 1999). In the early 1990s, many people were optimistic about 
ASEAN’s function and neoliberal institutionalism was a key explanation. Especially after 
the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, ARF was design to 
play a managerial role in ensuring regional security (Acharya 1999). However, when 
Asian financial crisis occurred, the vulnerability of ASEAN was exposed because 
ASEAN was not capable to deal with the problem (Acharya 1999). Thus, Neoliberal 
institutionalism has less explanatory power in Southeast Asia security studies after 1997 
Asian financial crisis. Furthermore, the constructivist approach applies well to ASEAN 
security studies. In ASEAN studies, the institution is viewed as an informal structure, 
facilitating information sharing and trust building, rather than a formal structure enabling 
cooperation (Acharya 1999). This thesis focuses on the two theories without further 
discussing neoliberal institutionalism because within ASEAN studies debates are around 
realism and constructivism. 
The realist view, spearheaded by Mearsheimer, argues that survival is a state’s most 
important goal and the best guarantee of survival is to be a hegemon. Thus, it is almost 
unavoidable that China will try to dominate East Asia if China becomes an economic 
powerhouse (Mearsheimer 2001, 2006, 3-4). If China’s economy keeps growing over the 
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next few decades, the conflict between the U.S. and China will occur and the possibility 
of a fight is high (Mearsheimer 2006). Jones and Smith point out that even though China 
deals with sovereignty problems in a multilateral way within the ASEAN framework, 
actually China just utilized noninterference principle to exclude America’s involvement 
(Jones & Smith 2007, 179). 
Economically, China has benefited from ASEAN countries more than ASEAN 
countries have from China and the trade gap between China and ASEAN countries is 
increasing (Kurlantzick 2007, 73). Saunders showed that Southeast Asian as well as East 
Asian countries are becoming more dependent on exports to China, but China’s relative 
dependence on other regional Asian markets has not changed. For example, the share of 
Chinese exports going to East Asia (excludes Hong Kong) has declined from 34 percent 
in 1996 to 24 percent in 2006. However, China is exporting more to the U.S. and EU than 
to ASEAN states. China has become the largest trading partner for most countries in the 
Southeast Asian region since 2000 (Saunders 2008, 134).  
Regarding military force, Mearsheimer argues that, similar to how the United States 
pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere in the 20th century, it 
is also likely that China will want to push the United States out of Asia (Mearsheimer 
2006). If China’s economy keeps growing over the next few decades, the conflict 
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between the U.S. and China will occur because great powers always attempt to exclude 
other possible rivals (Mearsheimer 2001: 41). Also, most of China's neighbors including 
India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam, will participate in America’s 
containment against China because they also fear the “China threat” (Mearsheimer 2006). 
Swaine indicated that the PLA is deploying a growing number of high-tech ballistic 
missiles in South and Southeast China. In this situation, the political leaders in Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines were concerned about China’s employment of 
military forces to influence the security environment (Swaine 2005, 274,276-7). 
Realists tend to view all state policies, including economic, military and both 
traditional and non-traditional security issues, as all related to relative gains. That is, state 
completion in a zero-sum game among all issue areas. 
Constructivism 
Constructivists see China’s participation in ASEAN as a process of socialization in 
which China followed ASEAN’s norm and changed its foreign behavior from bilateralism 
to multilateralism. Eaton and Stubbs argue that ASEAN has successfully incorporated 
China to follow its norms and facilitated economic cooperation (Eaton & Stubbs 2006, 
147). For example, China has signed Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), 
demonstrating that China has accepted ASEAN’s norm (Eaton & Stubbs 2006, 147). Ba 
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(2006) applied constructivism to analyze how the “complex engagement” between 
ASEAN and China transforms their mutual perception. She argues that this complex 
engagement “is not passive, but active; not static but dynamic” (Ba 2006, 161). This 
non-confrontational engagement encourages China to welcome dialogue and compromise 
(Ba 2006, 175). Johnston also suggests that China is increasingly getting used to 
engaging with its neighbors multilaterally by illustrating the change in China’s attitude 
toward ARF from a doubtful observer to full participation (Johnston 1999, 312-3). 
Constructivists stress the function of the ASEAN Way in the shape of ASEAN’s norm. 
Acharya defined ASEAN Way as  
a “process of regional interactions and cooperation based on discreteness, 
informality, consensus building and non-confrontational bargaining styles which are 
often contrasted with the adversarial posturing, majority vote and other legalistic 
decision-making procedures in Western multilateral negotiations” (Acharya 2009, 
79).   
Shambaugh argues that China has incorporated the ASEAN Way (Shambaugh 2004, 
74).  During the process of China’s participation in ASEAN in the 2000s, China 
constrained its sovereign interests and sought for greater regional interdependence 
through multilateralism (Shambaugh 2004, 76). ASEAN also believed that it is a good 
strategy to engage with China via ASEAN’s norms and institutions in order to hedge 
against China’s potential dominance (Shambaugh 2004, 76).   
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Some evidence shows that ASEAN’s norms socialized China’s foreign policy behavior. 
Johnston suggests that China has gradually become more comfortable in engaging with 
its neighbors in a multilateral way. For example, in 1997, China’s leadership felt uneasy 
with ARF’s preventative diplomacy that can enable ASEAN top officials to investigate or 
mediate disputes by sending ARF special representatives on fact-finding missions and 
mediation (Johnston 1999, 312). Moreover, rather than using strictly bilateral discussions 
to deal with disputes in the South China Sea, the Chinese leadership complied with ARF 
consensus decisions about these disputes (Johnston 1999, 312-3). Thus Johnston suggests 
that since China joined ARF, it has been socialized into the regional community rather 
than utilizing the ARF to balance against the U.S. (Johnston 1999, 316). 
To sum up, constructivists believe that China’s acceptance of ASEAN’s norm and rule 
has successfully socialized China and changed its foreign behavior through the process of 
multilateral engagement in ASEAN-led institutions. However, like realists, constructivists 
also tend to fall into a trap where all foreign behavior in all issue areas is reflected in one 
explanation. 
 
Mixture of realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism 
Some authors attempt to apply both explanations on broad theoretical terms, but few 
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have systematically examined issue areas and where each theory/assumption applies. 
Acharya used constructivism to explain the development of ASEAN (Acharya 2000), but 
he combined the lens of realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism to discuss 
the China-ASEAN relationship (Acharya 2003). Acharya indicated that ASEAN Way 
neither comes from shared cultural heritage nor the initial agreement made by the 
founders of ASEAN. It is not based on the “liberal logic of economic interdependence.” 
Rather, it emerges from a “long-term process of interaction and adjustment” (Acharya 
2000, 71-2,194-5). Regarding long-run China-ASEAN relationship, Acharya argued that 
“the key drivers… are the nature of Sino-US rivalry, the structure of regional economic 
interdependence, and the evolution of cooperative security norms in the region.” 
(Acharya 2003, ii) In other words, the key factors of realism (big powers Sino-US 
rivalry), neoliberal institutionalism (economic interdependence), and constructivism 
(evolution of cooperative security norms) are all taken into consideration in the 
China-ASEAN relationship.  
For Acharya, the relationship between China and ASEAN is more complex than the 
relations among ASEAN core member states. ASEAN tried not to provoke China’s 
nationalism so it avoided displaying a containment posture against China. ASEAN was 
not willing to ally strategically with China due to the uncertainties of the political costs. 
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However, as China grew as an economic power, ASEAN members did not want to miss 
the growing economic and trade opportunities with China (Acharya 2003, 1-2). For China, 
despite ASEAN’s pro-US defense orientation, it still viewed ASEAN as a benign regional 
organization where a mutually beneficial relationship could be cultivated. Also, China 
carefully engaged with ASEAN in a bid to encourage cooperation rather than push 
ASEAN closer to the U.S. and Japan (Acharya 2003, 2). With this complex relationship 
between China and ASEAN, it is clear that the realist assumptions oversimplified the 
notion that Southeast Asian nations are balancing China or cooperating with China 
against the U.S (Acharya 2003, 2). Nevertheless, Acharya did not systematically 
examined issue areas in China-ASEAN relations and the applicability of each theory in 
different issue areas. 
As China’s economic and military power is rising as well as China-ASEAN’s 
economic integration, it remains unclear whether realism or neoliberal institutionalism is 
a more applicable explanation for China’s foreign behavior toward ASEAN member 
states. In the perspective of liberal institutionalism, during the process of China’s 
engagement with Southeast Asian countries, the Chinese leadership gradually understood 
that the cost of cooperation is lower than conflict costs. Therefore, China was willing to 
compromise with regional organizations and adhered to the international rules to achieve 
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common interests and regional stability (Saunders 2008, 142). Ba argued that China’s 
motivation of enhancing cooperation is the increasing need to deal with regional financial 
problems rather than the attempt to exclude the U.S. influence (Ba 2008, 117).  
 
Confusing problems 
There is one unresolved problem in the debate over the China-ASEAN relationship. It 
is the dimensions of power relations between China and ASEAN. The conflict between 
realism and constructivism derives from different understandings of power (Eaton & 
Stubbs 2006, 141-2). Constructivist understanding of power is the power to “reduce 
regional tensions and increase regional economic cooperation to its advantage by having 
regional states sign on to its norms and follow its practices (Eaton & Stubbs 2006, 147).” 
The realist concept of power is coercive power, mainly political and military power, to 
create regional balance of power (Eaton & Stubbs 2006, 139). In this sense, the 
constructivist lens provides a more powerful explanation of ASEAN than the realist lens 
(Eaton & Stubbs 2006, 151). Indeed, various IR theories give different weights to the 
idea of power. For constructivism, power works through intersubjective understandings 
of interests and identities between states (Wendt 1992, 401). For realism, states are driven 
to seek for power to ensure survival under anarchical structure and self-help system 
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(Waltz 1979a, 120), without consideration of intersubjective meanings and interactive 
process. But if realism and constructivism are not comparable due to different concepts of 
power, it is hard to analyze the China-ASEAN relationship on a commensurable basis.  
A systemic analysis based on clear power dimensions is needed to explain the 
complexity of the China-ASEAN relationship. Realism and constructivism could have 
different of applicability in China-ASEAN relationship. Realist explanation assumes 
China’s intention is unchanged during the process of interaction with ASEAN. For 
example, even if China followed ASEAN Way and multilateralism, China could not be 
socialized by ASEAN and would just attempt to expand its influence in Southeast Asia. 
Furthermore, realism focuses on China’s growing economic power which will be 
translated to military power (Mearsheimer 2001, 4), but ignore other possible evolution 
of China-ASEAN relationship through intense economic exchange and the qualitative 
change in the China-ASEAN military relationship. The constructivist explanation focuses 
on the process of socialization between China and ASEAN but the explanation is not 
systemic enough to figure out a clear direction of China-ASEAN relationship. For 
example, Ba depicted ASEAN states complex engagement of China as a persuasive and 
deliberative process in which meaningful changes of mutual perceptions and interests 
takes place (Ba 2006, 174). Ba refused to use the lens of realism to see power as coercive 
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power but stressed that it is more important to examine the social context of interactions 
than to examine power asymmetries (Ba 2006, 174). Acharya mentions the factors mixing 
realist, neoliberalist, and constructivist elements that affect China-ASEAN relations and 
he also discusses specific cases such as the South China Sea dispute and the competition 
for foreign direct investment, but he does not systematically examine the applicability of 
IR theories on China-ASEAN relations. Like Acharya, Ba did not systematically examine 
the empirical evidence by using realist and constructivist lens. Constructivists focus on 
the normative structure that constitutes states’ identities and interests but they rarely 
define normative structure in terms of power (Barnett & Duvall 2005, 41). Without 
conceptualization of power, it is hard to know how states behavior are constrained and 
how their fates are determined (Barnett & Duvall 2005, 41). 
 
Problem to be solved and the essence of my contribution 
One way to resolve the conceptual problems between the realist and constructivist is to 
empirically examine specific issues between China and ASEAN states. Through an 
empirical analysis of the change in military power, economic power, and institutional 
power between China and ASEAN in the past two decades, I will analyze how realism 
and constructivism are applicable in different dimensions of the China-ASEAN 
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relationship. I argue that neither realism nor constructivism can neatly explain the 
China-ASEAN relationship. Rather, realism and constructivism can apply according to 
the different issue dimensions of the relationship.  
 
Road map paragraph 
First, I demonstrate how the realist and constructivist concepts of military, economic, and 
institutional power are applied to the China-ASEAN relationship. Second, I use some 
empirical cases to illustrate the comparison. In the military relationship, I compare 
China-ASEAN and US-ASEAN joint military exercises and the content of 
China-ASEAN military cooperation. In the economic relationship, I discuss the 
competitiveness and complementarity in China-ASEAN trade and China’s foreign 
economic behavior toward ASEAN. In the institutional relationship, I analyze whether 
China followed ASEAN rules to address the most sensitive disputes between China and 
ASEAN member states through ASEAN’s multilateral mechanism, this shows to what 
extent ASEAN’s institutions can influence China’s foreign policy behavior. I also 
illustrate some cases where China has attempted to influence ASEAN institutions for 
national gains. Finally, I explain the issue specific application of realism and 





Part II. Theory 
Power is the core concept to examine the relationship between states. Some scholars 
offer multi-dimensional of power definitions in order to examine the complex nature of 
multilateral and bilateral relations (Barnett & Duvall 2005; Katzenstein 2005). For 
example, Katzenstein separates power into territorial and nonterritorial concepts and he 
explains, “Territorial power was at the center of the old land and maritime empires” and 
nonterritorial power is “characterized by a fluid instability that manifests itself in hybrid 
identities, flexible hierarchies, multiple exchanges, and the production of new forms of 
authority and coercion across boundaries (Katzenstein 2005, 3-4).” Katzenstein also 
suggests that regions have both material and symbolic dimensions and we can trace these 
dimensions in patterns of behavioral interdependence and political practice (Katzenstein 
2005, 4). Barnett and Duvall (2005) analyzed power concept in realism, neoliberal 
institutionalism and constructivism and categorized four different forms of power: (1) 
compulsory power, (2) institutional power, (3) structural power, (4) and productive power. 
Basically, in order to accommodate different IR theories, these scholars take into 
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consideration both material and non-material power as a framework to analyze the 
“balance of power” or the relationship between states. 
In order to examine the application of realism and constructivism to China-ASEAN 
relationship, I take military, economic, and institutional as power dimensions, including 
material and nonmaterial power, to analyze the development of China-ASEAN 
relationship in the past twenty years. 
 
Material factor: military power 
Realism, including both neorealism and postclassical realism, emphasizes material 
factors (Brooks 1997, 446). Realists have different views about relative importance of 
military power and economic power. For example, Mearsheimer pays close attention on 
military power, while Gilpin and Kennedy emphasized economic power (Brooks 1997, 
460). Still, both military power and economic power are the core factors determining the 
arrangement of states’ power. Yet, if there is a conflict between the two goals, military 
power has priority over economic power (Brooks 1997, 447).  
Although constructivists focus on non-material much more than material power, they 
still recognize material power as an important component in international relations (Hopf 
1998, 96). However, there is a fundamental difference between realism and 
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constructivism in the concept of material power. Unlike the realists that take material 
power as the basis of states’ behavior, constructivists seek to understand agents’ identities 
and structures that are mutually constitutive (Hopf 1998, 181). Constructivists consider 
material power as a part of identity rather than an independent factor. Perceptions of each 
other determine how they use material power. Moreover, constructivists argue that 
perceptions of material power matters because shared perceptions and ideas can influence 
international socialization. Despite of this ontological discrepancy, ideas and material are 
not mutually exclusive. In realism, which is categorized as rationalism, ‘desire + belief = 
action’ is the basic formula. Ideas also play an essential role in actors’ behavior under this 
logic (Fearon & Wendt, 59). Therefore, material power is an important explanatory factor 
for both realist and constructivist in China-ASEAN studies. 
For realism, zero-sum game is also a core feature that states face in the international 
system2. While facing international cooperation, a state is more concerned with “Who 
will gain more?” than with “Will both of us gain?” because the other state(s) may acquire 
greater capabilities (Waltz 1979b, 105) Therefore, states tend to pursue relative gains 
rather than absolute gains. The debate over zero-sum game versus non-zero-sum game 
within international security studies mainly takes place between realism and neoliberal 
                                                      
2 See Keohane 1984, 67-9. 
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institutionalism. Neoliberal institutionalism argues that inter-states cooperation increasing 
absolute gains is possible through international regime that can decrease transaction cost 
and prevent member states from cheating (Keohane 1984, 94,96-7,103). Contrary to 
realists, neoliberalists argue that states care about their absolute gains more than relative 
gains (Baldwin 1993, 5-6). The constructivist position is very similar to neoliberal 
institutionalism in zero-sum vs. non zero-sum game debate. The liberal 
functional-institutional logic shared by both neoliberal institutionalism and 
constructivism produces a similar argument that states’ preference and perception can be 
changed with prolonged participation in international institutions (Sterling-Folker 2000, 
109). However, within the process of socialization, constructivism is more attuned to the 
change of identities and ideas than neoliberal institutionalism. 
One realist assumption is a consistent expansion of military power. In the case of 
China-ASEAN military relationship, if China’s aggressive behavior to extend its military 
power that may also exclude the U.S. military power in Southeast Asia remains constant 
during the process of China-ASEAN interaction, then this suggests that an intention to 
strengthen its military power in order to ensure its survival. The socialization of China 
into the ASEAN Way could not change China’s identity or perception of ASEAN. In this 
situation, realism may provide a better explanation of China-ASEAN relationship than 
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constructivism. If China’s military behavior altered from aggressive to cooperative during 
the process of China-ASEAN engagement over time in ASEAN-led institutions, 
constructivism is a better explanation China-ASEAN relationship. Because it suggests 
that ASEAN’s socialization to China changed China’s identity and preference. 
The observations of the China-ASEAN military relationship can be both quantitative 
and qualitative. Including a comparison of China and America’s independent joint 
military exercise with ASEAN states as well as the content of the China-ASEAN military 
cooperation and ASEAN’s multilateral security dialogue. The growth of China’s military 
budget is a possible indicator of the China military threat to Southeast Asia, but how this 
increase spending has influenced the quantity and quality of China’s military power is 
controversial. While China’s military budget is a generally accepted index to measure its 
military power, it is not transparent (Bitzinger 2003). Furthermore, China’s annual 
military budget does not reflect China’s military influence over ASEAN.  
Joint military exercise is an important form of military cooperation in ASEAN and it is 
often viewed as an indicator of positive military relationship within ASEAN (Acharya 
1991; Stubbs 1992). The comparison between China-ASEAN and US-ASEAN joint 
military exercise can show how China-ASEAN military relationship relative to 
US-ASEAN military relationship changed. If China-ASEAN joint military exercises 
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gradually increased, it suggests that the military relationship between them is getting 
better and China has become more involved in regional security. This also reflects greater 
trust between ASEAN member states, and supports the constructivist’s perspective that 
China is incorporated into ASEAN collective security. If China-ASEAN joint military 
exercises did not increase during the process of China’s participation in ASEAN and even 
ASEAN states sought for more military cooperation with the U.S., this suggests that 
China’s involvement in regional security is still limited and the distrust between China 
and ASEAN remains. 
The content of China-ASEAN military cooperation can demonstrate the nature of their 
military relationship. The feature of realist zero-sum game is that one state increases its 
benefit at the expense of the other one. If China’s military cooperation with ASEAN 
excludes the U.S. force, this relationship is a zero-sum game. If China’s military 
cooperation with ASEAN enhances collective security without undermining the U.S. 
military influence, this relationship is a non zero-sum game. 
 
Material factor: economic power 
Similar to military power, realists are concerned more with relative economic gains 
than absolute gains. Economic power is seen as substantial resource to accumulate 
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military power. For realism, economic relations are a zero-sum game in which states 
attempt to get economic benefits at the expense of the other states. Constructivists do not 
view economic relations as a zero-sum game, but rather it is a constitutive process where 
states alter their understanding of economic benefits. Indeed, the economic relationship 
between two states can present greater possibilities to develop a deeper relations and 
inter-dependence (Ba 2006, 164) 
Economic interdependence can reflect balance or unbalanced trade. States have used 
unfair trade balances to increase relative gains. Thus, we can evaluate the explanatory 
power of realism and constructivism by examining trade and investment relationship 
between China and ASEAN. If China utilized its economic relationship with ASEAN to 
benefit itself rather than collective benefit, realist assumptions can better explain 
China-ASEAN economic relationship. However, if China’s economic policy enhanced 
collective economic security rather than benefited itself at the expense of ASEAN states 
economy, constructivism can better explain the China-ASEAN relationship.  
Key observations include the trade and FDI inflow between China and ASEAN, and 
China’ foreign economic policies toward ASEAN. The trade and investment flows 
between China and ASEAN states are popular indices to examine whether China 
benefited at the expense of ASEAN states or all states benefited mutually in their growing 
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economic relationship (Wong & S. Chan 2003; Eichengreen, Rhee, & Tong 2007; 
Ahearne et al. 2003; Tongzon 2005; Ravenhill 2006). For both scholars and policy 
makers, FDI flows is a key indicator to examine whether China-ASEAN trade is a 
zero-sum game or not (Acharya 2003, 8). The political leaders in ASEAN states are also 
concerned with the unbalanced FDI inflow to ASEAN states and China. For example, the 
Singapore government worried that China attracted a large amount of FDI from Asian 
market but the FDI inflows that ASEAN states absorbed were decreasing relative to 
China (Acharya 2003, 8) .If the competitiveness (unbalanced trade) between China and 
ASEAN grew, then the economic relationship tends to be a zero-sum game. Yet more 
balanced (complementary) trade between China and ASEAN grew, then this reflects a 
mutual economic relationship. Both neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism expect 
more balanced relationship. However, for constructivists China-ASEAN trade and FDI 
inflow is not enough because it lacks information about whether China’s perception of 
economic security has changed (i.e. from zero-sum to absolute gains). China’s official 
and public foreign economic policy statements toward ASEAN is a key indicator of 
China’s perception. These official statements reflect how the ideas about economic 
security, and how they evolved during China’s participation in ASEAN. 
China’s monetary policy toward ASEAN is also a significant empirical observation to 
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examine how China-ASEAN economic relationship changed. For example, 1997 Asian 
financial crisis is seen as a turning point to the development of ASEAN and China’s role 
in East Asian economic integration (Ba 2008, 116-7; Goh & Acharya 2007, 99; Gilson 
2006, 222; Kurlantzick 2007, 69; Curley & Thomas 2007, 1). China’s policy reaction not 
deprecating reminbi (RMB) during financial crisis was both beneficial to China and 
ASEAN member states (Kurlantzick 2007, 69). This policy action helped China gain the 
trust of ASEAN.  
During the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, the countries suffering serious damage 
economically, mainly South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia, needed emergent 
financial aids but America was indifferent to help them. China did not devalue its 
currency and keep pegging RMB to US dollar (Kurlantzick 2007:69). If China devalued 
its currency, it can make its export more competitive but other Asian states will loss and 
exacerbate their economies. These wrecked countries appreciated China’s decision 
because China didn’t benefit itself at the expense of them (Kurlantzick 2007:69). With 
the disappointment of America’s attitude, ASEAN countries turned to aggrandize 
ASEAN’s function and organization in order to ensure their economic security 
(Kurlantzick 2007:70). Unlike the distrust to multilateral diplomacy before, China 
gradually played a substantial role to bolster the multilateral system in ASEAN and 
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proposed some initiatives contributing regional economic stability, such as the Chiang 
Mai Initiative3 in 2000 and the proposal of joint Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with 
Japan and South Korea (Gilson 2006, 222).  
I examine China’s monetary policy toward ASEAN states during financial crisis in 
1997 and in 2008 to identify China’s economic security idea (i.e. either realist or 
constructivist). In addition, China’s bilateral economic cooperation with ASEAN member 
states is also a meaningful observation. Is China using bilateral economic cooperation to 
undermine ASEAN or to create regional welfare and trade balance?  
 
Non-material factor: institutional power 
One main debate between realists and constructivists is either big powers (mainly 
China and the U.S.) or ASEAN shaped Southeast Asian security. This debate is situated in 
the theoretical argument between realism and constructivism about whether military and 
economic power can transcend norms and identities (Jackson 2004). Realists clearly 
maintain that norms and identities cannot influence a state’s desire for survival (i.e. 
                                                      
3 Chiang Mai Initiative aimed at initiating further cooperation on monitoring capital flows and 
building swap networks in order to prevent from the re-occurrence of financial crisis aroused 
from uncontrolled capital flows. In response to the global financial crisis occurred in September 
2008, China, Japan, and South Korea made a commitment to expand the swap lines in a bid to 
deepen Chiang Mai Initiative and stabilize regional financial and economic order. See The Joint 
Ministerial Statement of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting. (2000, May 6). Chiang Mai, 
Thailand; Towards a co-ordinated macroeconomic expansion among Asian economies (2008, 
November 13). Financial Times. 
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perceptions of economic and military power), but constructivism disagrees with this 
argument4. Constructivists believe that norms and identities are influential compared to 
material power in supporting Southeast Asian security (Eaton & Stubbs 2006; Acharya 
2005; Ba 2006). Realists argue that it is big powers rather than ASEAN norms that 
determine regional security (Emmers 2001; Leifer 1999).  
In the case of China-ASEAN relationship, the problem is whether China was 
socialized by ASEAN’s norms and followed the ASEAN Way, or China exerted its will 
upon ASEAN and utilized ASEAN rules to serve its own interests.  
The observations of institutional power include how China dealt with its core 
interest – South China Sea dispute - through ASEAN institution and which initiatives 
China offered in ASEAN institutions. South China Sea is the most sensitive security issue 
between China and ASEAN states as well as a classic case study to examine ASEAN’s 
institutional power to socialize China (Acharya 2003; Emmers 2001; Evans 2003; Leifer 
1999). The Spratly islands in South China Sea are a collection of coral reefs, atolls and 
sand bars covering seventy thousand square miles, whose sovereignty is partly or wholly 
claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines (Dosch 2008, 
                                                      
4 There is still a subtle difference within constructivism. Liberal-constructivism argues that 
power can be transcended by norms and identities, while realist-constructivism does not. In this 




164). Initially, China refused to deal with sovereign controversy on Spratly Islands in 
South China Sea other than a bilateral basis (Jones & Smith 2007, 177). After China 
participated in ARF, it was more involved in multilateral dialogue regarding to South 
China Sea dispute (Cheng-Chwee 2005, 103). However, the process did not go smoothly 
because China still kept awareness of its sovereignty interest which could be potentially 
undermined by ASEAN’s multilateral mechanism. Therefore, the South China Sea 
dispute is a key case showing China’s foreign policy behavior. 
We can also examine which initiatives China offered in ASEAN institutions in order to 
see whether China intended to shape ASEAN rules in favor of its interests. For example, 
China’s support for Malaysia’s initiative of East Asia Summit in which the U.S. alliance 
states were excluded implies China’s realist behavior. 
 
Part III. Application:  
 
Military Power 
China and America’s military relations with ASEAN states 
The scale of military cooperation is broad, but some exchanges are not transparent. 
For example, the exchange of intelligence and military procurement are not publicized. 
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Joint military exercises are typically announced and covered in the media. As a result, 
joint military exercises are considered an important index to evaluate the military 
cooperation (Acharya 1991; Stubbs 1992). As Table 1 shows, ASEAN-US military 
relations are much closer than ASEAN-China relations. Although China planned to build 
solid military relations with ASEAN, the post-9/11 US-ASEAN military relationship 
intensified the deployment of counter terrorism forces (Banlaoi 2003, 102). For example, 
America’s Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) was an anti-terror 
program that included six ASEAN countries: Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Brunei. Indeed, the U.S. holds annual CARAT joint exercises with 
the six countries. In addition, the U.S. is increasingly enhancing military relations with 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia5. U.S. officials denied that the military ties with ASEAN 
are in reaction to a rising China6, but it is possible that China’s leadership views the 
growing American military presence as an attempt to contain China.  
China’s military relations with ASEAN is more limited than the U.S.-ASEAN 
exchanges. For example, Singapore and Thailand are the only two ASEAN countries that 
held joint exercise with China.  
Table 1 ASEAN-US and ASEAN-China Joint Exercise 
                                                      




 America China 
Singapore 2007 
Joint exercise (with India, 
Japan, Australia) 
2007 
The 2nd Western Pacific Naval 
Symposium Multilateral Sea 
Exercise 
Annual joint exercise 
(Cooperation Afloat Readiness 
and Training, Cobra Gold 
military exercise) 
2007 
The 2nd Western Pacific Naval 
Symposium Multilateral Sea 
Exercise (with America, 
French, Japan, Australia, New 
Zealand, India, Pakistan, and 
South Korea) 
Thailand Annual joint exercise 
(Cooperation Afloat Readiness 
and Training, Cobra Gold 
military exercise) 
2007,2008  
Joint anti-terror exercise 
2005 
Joint search and rescue exercise
Malaysia Annual joint exercise 




US Military relation with 
Indonesia was resumed 
Annual joint exercise 
(Cooperation Afloat Readiness 




Joint anti-terror exercise 
None. 
The Philippines Annual joint exercise 
(Cooperation Afloat Readiness 
and Training) 
None. 
Brunei Annual joint exercise 
(Cooperation Afloat Readiness 
and Training) 
None. 
Myanmar None. None. 
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Vietnam None. None. 
Laos None. None. 
Sources: 
Complied by the author. Ali 2007; Five states naval exercise: Asian NATO speeds up 
2007; US-Malaysia joint military exercise 2002; US draws China's traditional allies to 
strengthen military cooperation in order to contain China 2008; US-China competition in 
Cambodia: Developing military relationship 2008; US boosts military ties with Vietnam, 
Laos, Cambodia 2008; 2008 Defense White Paper; Chinese army participated joint 
military exercises for 17 times 2007; 2010 Cobra Gold military exercise 2010. 
 
Under the intensive and growing military relations between the U.S. and ASEAN, it is 
hard to imagine China as a serious military threat to the region. China’s military power 
certainly cannot compete with ASEAN states who are allied with the U.S. For instance, 
China does not have an aircraft carrier or battle group nor long-range bombers. In fact, 
the Chinese navy is not capable of international projection of naval forces (Shambaugh 
2004, 86). Moreover, anti-terrorism is also a common goal shared by China and ASEAN. 
Therefore China has no strategic reason to oppose ASEAN-US military cooperation. In a 
nutshell, America’s military power is obviously stronger than China in Southeast Asia 
and China’s military power is not a threat for ASEAN’s security. 
 
Security dialogue and military cooperation between China and ASEAN 
The military cooperation between China and ASEAN is mainly in nontraditional security. 
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For example, in 2002, China and ASEAN states signed “Joint Declaration of ASEAN and 
China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues”, that notes that 
China and ASEAN governments will deepen bilateral and multilateral cooperation in 
no-traditional security issues such as trafficking in illegal drugs, people-smuggling 
including trafficking in women and children, sea piracy, terrorism, arms-smuggling, 
money-laundering, international economic crime and cyber crime. China and ASEAN 
promised to strengthen information exchange, training, joint investigations in 
non-traditional security issues on the basis of existing mechanisms such as the ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting and Senior Officials Meeting7. In the following years, China has 
continued nontraditional security cooperation with ASEAN. In 2005, China proposed 
initiatives on disaster prevention at the Special ASEAN Leaders' Meeting8. China 
proposed “The ARF General Guidelines for Disaster Relief Cooperation” at the 14th 
ARF Ministerial Meeting in 2007 and it was adopted as the first formal guidance to 
address cooperative disaster issues9.  
China stressed that its military cooperation with other nations is based on the 
principles of non-alignment, non-confrontation, and non-targeting at any other countries 
                                                      
7 Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security 
Issues, Phnom Penh, 4 November 2002. 
8 2006 White Paper on PRC National Defense, 33. 
9 2008 Defense White Paper, 48. 
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and the promotion of security through dialogue and cooperation10. This idea is part of 
China’s New Security Concept, that was submitted at the Ninth ARF Foreign Ministers’ 
Conference in 2002. In the document, China acknowledges the ARF’s role to promote 
confidence building measures (CBM) and preventive diplomacy. This document suggests 
that there is a growing level of mutual trust between China and ASEAN. 
Although South China Sea dispute remains, China did adopt flexible and prudent 
posture to enhance its military cooperation with ASEAN. Despite China’s strong stance 
on South China Sea sovereignty issue, China attempted to build closer military 
relationships with ASEAN through cooperation in nontraditional security issues and 
multilateral dialogues after becoming a full participant in ARF.  
 
Applicability of realism and constructivism 
According to China’s moderate military policy to ASEAN, it appears that realism cannot 
neatly explain China-ASEAN military relationship. If China-ASEAN military 
relationship follows the realist assumptions, then we should see China extended its 
military power in ASEAN and attempted to force the U.S. out of the ASEAN region. But 
this is not the situation in the China-ASEAN military relationship. The U.S. has 
                                                      
10 See China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept. 
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maintained and even strengthened its military allies in the name of anti-terrorism in 
Southeast Asia, without overt resistant from the Chinese government. China has also 
established military cooperation with a few ASEAN states, but it is by no means able to 
compete with U.S. military influence. More importantly, US-ASEAN and China-ASEAN 
military cooperation are not mutually exclusive. This is because cooperation is mainly 
within non-traditional security areas, such as anti-terrorism and sea piracy, rather than in 
the traditional security issues that targets a third state. That is, US-ASEAN and 
China-ASEAN military relationship is not a pure zero-sum game. Enhancing 
non-traditional security in Southeast Asia is a common goal shared by the U.S., China, 
and ASEAN states.  
Realists would argue that most ASEAN states still distrust China and therefore they 
maintain military ties with the U.S. in order to contain the China threat. For example, 
Singapore Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew reminded the U.S. government to actively 
participate Asian affairs in order to balance China’s economic and military power11. 
Indeed, Lee states that ASEAN members believe the U.S. is irreplaceable in East Asia12, 
while ASEAN member states may express concerns over China’s military power. 
However, it is not the primary factor driving ASEAN’s military cooperation with the 
                                                      




United States. Unlike the situation in 1990s where America was intent to contain China 
and, in turn, China was suspicious of maritime security cooperation, nowadays both 
powers have a mutual interest to prevent their strategic sea lanes from transnational 
threats (Bradford 2005, 75-6). Non-traditional security threats play an increasingly 
significant role in Southeast Asian states’ security policy. Despite of some ASEAN states’ 
intention to build military ties with the U.S. in order to hedge against China, the principle 
dynamic of military cooperation is non-traditional security. This implies their cooperative 
military relationship as a non-zero sum game, and military cooperation can also enhance 
absolute benefits. Therefore, realism cannot depict China-ASEAN military relationship 
neatly. 
Constructivism provides a better explanation for the development of mutual trust 
within the China-ASEAN military relationship because China’s perception of the ARF 
changed after China’s participation and engagement with ASEAN member states. The 
evidence shown above implies that China’s posture in security issues has evolved from 
aggressive to cooperative toward ASEAN. In the 1990s, China was reluctant to discuss 
security issues in ARF. This was over concerns that multilateral dialogue would 
undermine China’s autonomy (Evans 2003, 747). After China’s full participation in ARF, 
serious discussions began over confidence building measures, preventative diplomacy 
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and conflict resolution via ARF’s multilateral dialogues (Evans 2003, 752). Initially 
China’s perception of the ARF was ASEAN’s tool to internationalize the Spratly Islands 
dispute or as a way for America to indirectly intervene in China’s domestic affairs 
(Cheng-Chwee 2005, 106). However, China’s concerns gradually diminished due to 
direct diplomatic engagement and security issues within the ARF. Regarding hard 
security issues, such as South China Sea dispute, China is still not very comfortable with 
discussing it within ARF (see below). Nevertheless, China has become more willingly to 
address this issue within the regional forum. This is a recent and significant development. 
To sum up, constructivism is more pertinent than realism to explain the development of 
China-ASEAN military relationship. 
 
Economic Power 
China-ASEAN trade relations and Foreign Direct Investment 
China-ASEAN trade relationship is controversial among scholars. Some scholars 
argue that China and other East Asian countries are competing against each other for a 
greater share of the global markets and that China has increased its exports at the expense 
of other East Asian and Southeast Asian countries in some industries (Ahearne, et al. 
2003, Eichengreen, et al. 2007, Tongzon 2005, Wong and Chan 2003). Wong and Chan 
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(2003) point out that even though NIE (New Industrial Economies: Taiwan, South Korea, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore) and ASEAN’s market shares are higher than China, the 
increase in China’s share is associated with the decrease in NIE and ASEAN’s share. It is 
suggested that China becoming more competitive than other Asian countries in electronic 
goods (Wong and Chan 2003, 521). Eichengreen et al. (2007) studied the impact of 
China’s export of capital goods, consumer goods and intermediates13, since 1990 to 2003. 
Eichengreen found that China’s export of labor-intensive goods, specifically textiles, 
crowded out other Asian countries’ exports of textiles but this effect was not shown in the 
other manufactured goods (Eichengreen, et al. 2007, 222). China’s export of 
labor-intensive goods has the greatest negative influence on low-income ASEAN 
countries. For example, in 2002, 91% of exports of manufactured consumer goods in 
Cambodia are textiles, while it is only 10% in Singapore (Eichengreen, et al. 2007, 
222-3). The manufactured consumer goods that high-income Asian countries exported 
were mostly technological-intensive goods. For example, in 2002, 30% of Japan’s 
                                                      
13 The authors’ classification of goods follow the second version of the Standard International 
Trade Classification (SITC 2) offered by UN data. Capital goods include machinery and transport 
equipment (a subset of group 7 in SITC 2). Consumption goods include food (group 0), beverages 
and tobacco (group 1), miscellaneous manufactured articles (group 8), television and radio 
receivers (7.6.1, 7.6.2, and 7.6.3), passengermotor vehicles and cycles (7.8.1 and 7.8.5), and 
medicinal and pharmaceutical products (5.4). All the remaining goods (groups 2,3, 4, 5, 6 and 9) 
are classified as intermediates. See Eichengreen et al.(2007), p.212. About the content of SITC 2, 




electronic high-tech manufactured consumer goods were professional instruments, while 
Vietnam export of high-tech goods was only 0.5% during the same period (Eichengreen, 
et al. 2007, 23). Therefore, China’s exports of labor-intensive goods crowded out other 
low-income Asian countries’ exports of those same goods, but countries with high-tech 
exports were unaffected. However, taking into account China’s expanding market, 
countries that export natural resources still can benefit from China’s growing demand for 
raw materials (Eichengreen, et al. 2007, 23). 
Still some scholars argued that the exports from China and the other East Asian 
countries are complementary in terms of vertical integration of production market. For 
example, Ahearne, Fernald, Loungani, and Schindler (2003) show that the electronic 
exports from China, NIEs and ASEAN countries increased at a similar rate since 1981 to 
2001. They offered a possible explanation—the vertical integration of many product 
markets. That is, Asian countries exported intermediate goods to China, and China 
exported final goods to the third market. For example, the components of DVD players 
such as motherboards, memory were imported from NIES or ASEAN countries to China, 
and these components were assembled in China and then exported to other markets. In 
this situation, the exports from China, NIEs and ASEAN countries are positively 
correlated and complementary (Ahearne, et al. 2003, 4-5).  
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Tongzon (2005) finds that China and ASEAN countries have different comparative 
advantage so that they export what their counterpart need. Raw materials and component 
parts occupied more than a half of China’s imports (Tongzon 2005, 204). China’s exports 
worth of $1 million need the imports of intermediate goods and components worth of 
about $500,000 14 . ASEAN’s comparative advantages are raw materials and some 
capital-intensive goods, such as machinery and electrical appliances, chemicals and base 
metal and base metal products, while China’s comparative advantage is still 
labor-intensive goods despite its increasing export of high-value manufactured goods 
(Tongzon 2005, 201).  
EU and the U.S. are the biggest export market for China15, while NIEs, Japan, and 
ASEAN countries are the main import sources for China16. Figure 1 shows China’s trade 
with other partners. China’s trade surplus earned from the U.S. and EU increased 
dramatically from 2001 (for EU it is from 2003) to 2007. China’s trade deficit with Japan 
and the NIEs also increased during the same period.  Despite China’s trade deficit with 
ASEAN, the deficit decreased after 2004 and the trade balance is much smaller than the 
                                                      
14 Don't Confuse Made in China with Made by China 2002. 
15 In 2008, EU and the U.S. ranked the first and the second export markets for China. See the 
statistics of Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, 
http://zhs2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ie/statistic/200901/20090105999708.html .  
16 In 2008, Japan, ASEAN, South Korea, and Taiwan ranked the first, the third, the fourth, and 




balance with Japan and the NIEs. This implies China may gain from a trade surplus with 
ASEAN in the future. In addition, China’s overall regional trade surplus is negative in 
2003 and 2004 but becomes positive after 2005. 
 
Figure 1: China’s trade surplus/deficit with US, EU, NIEs, and ASEAN (billion US 
dollars) 
   
Source: compiled by the author. The trade data is from:  
Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, retrieved from 
http://big5.mofcom.gov.cn/gate/big5/zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/tongji.shtml 
Note:  
1. Hong Kong is excluded from NIEs in this figure because most China’s export to Hong 
Kong is goods while most China’s import from Hong Kong is services. The trade 
structure between China and Hong Kong is largely different from it between China and 
other countries. Here I mainly discuss the trade for goods. Therefore Hong Kong is 
excluded in this figure. 




Considering the arguments above, these trends have several implications. First, 
China’s exports are associated with the imports from Japan, NIEs, and ASEAN. Thus the 
trade between China and NIEs and ASEAN countries are complementary. Second, 
China’s net trade surplus increased dramatically despite its large trade deficit with Japan 
and NIEs. Third, ASEAN’s comparative advantage against China is fading away. It is 
likely that ASEAN’s advantage on some kinds of goods, such as machinery and 
electronic appliances, was gradually surpassed by China’s advantage. In the 1990s, China 
had a lower comparative advantage in the areas of machinery and electronic appliances 
compared to some ASEAN countries (Tongzon 2005). However, China has already 
become the largest exporter of information and communication technology goods in the 
past four years17. Figure 2 shows that China’s exports of machinery and transport 
equipment to the world, at a faster growing pace than other country, exceeded all six 
ASEAN countries in 2005, and also surpassed Japan and the NIEs in 2006 and 2007 
respectively. Moreover, the rate of increase of ASEAN-6, the NIEs and Japan’s exports 
are slower than China  
 
                                                      
17 Of internet Cafés and Power Cuts: Technology in Emerging Economies 2008. 
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Figure 2: Export of Machinery and Transport Equipment to the world (billion US 
dollars) 
 
Source: WTO, International Trade and Tariff data, 
http://stat.wto.org/StatisticalProgram/WSDBStatProgramHome.aspx?Language=E  
Note: 
1. ASEAN-6 includes Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, and 
Vietnam. The rest of countries’ exports are negligible and therefore are not counted here. 
Singapore is counted in NIE group. 
 
Why did China’s export of machinery goods exceed the other East Asian countries? 
Tongzon suggests that a number of Japan and NIEs firms relocated factories that 
provided the more labor intensive final electronic goods to China in order to save labor 
costs. As a result, the NIEs and Japan were importing more from China (Tongzon 2005, 
197). However, it is also possible that technology gap between China and Japan/NIEs 
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was also shrinking due to greater technology transfers. For ASEAN countries, it is more 
obvious that their early advantage in the area of electronic goods was fading away 
quickly.  
Moreover, through state investment in science and technology, the Chinese 
government tried to promote domestic innovation and decrease the reliance on foreign 
countries’ technology18. Government investment in the sciences and professional training 
produced a more educated and skilled labor force in China’s high-tech industries, 
especially in the coastal regions. A survey conducted by McKinsey & Co. and China’s 
Tsinghua University shows that the gap in productivity between China and foreign 
countries’ technology companies is shrinking: Chinese high-tech companies’ average 
revenue per worker rose from 226,000 yuan in 2001 to 421,000 yuan in 2005, while the 
average revenue per worker in foreign technology firms in China decreases from 501,000 
yuan in 2001 to 439,000 yuan in 2005 (Dean 2006).   
China also captured the greatest inflow of foreign direct investment compared to Japan, 
NIEs, and ASEAN countries (see Figure 3). During 2007 to 2008, the share of world FDI 
inflow to Japan, NIEs (only Taiwan and South Korea are counted) was 1.3% and 0.6% 
respectively, and ASEAN was around 3.5%. China’s FDI inflow increases from 7% to 
                                                      
18 Consumer champion: Technology in China and India 2007. 
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10%. In addition, even though ASEAN’s FDI inflow reached record high in 2005, the real 
benefit was limited because most of the FDI flowed to labor-intensive manufacturing 
firms19. Due to the situation where China absorbed most of the high tech as well as labor 
intensive FDI inflow, ASEAN countries had a hard time developing high-tech industries 
via FDI.  
 







19 The Problem with Made in China: Manufacturing in Asia 2007. 
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1. The data of Indonesia from 2000 to 2002 are absent.  
2. Hong Kong is counted into China but not into NIEs in this figure. 
 
Indeed it appears that China’s high-tech industries developed faster than ASEAN 
states. Table 2 shows the amount and ranking of technology patent grants for Asian 
countries. Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea rank the second, fifth, and seventh in the 
world, respectively. Hong Kong and China rank 18th and 19th respectively, followed by 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Philippines. Notably, even though the actual amount 
of China’s patent grants are much lower than Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, the 
number of patents soar after 2005. The patent grants in Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, 
and Malaysia made comparatively little progress. 
Table 2: Patent Grant 
 Country Rank 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Japan 2 32922 34890 36339 37248 37032 31834 39411 35941 36679
Taiwan  5 5806 6545 6730 6676 7207 5993 7920 7491 7779
South Korea 7 3472 3763 4009 4132 4671 4591 6509 7264 8731
Hong Kong 18 548 621 589 681 641 596 753 756 717
China 19 161 265 390 424 597 565 970 1235 1874
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Singapore  22 242 304 421 460 485 377 469 451 450
Malaysia  33 47 56 62 63 93 98 131 173 168
Thailand  40 30 47 61 47 28 25 42 25 40
Philippines  43 12 15 19 25 21 18 35 21 22
Indonesia  53 14 10 15 12 23 23 16 15 19
Source: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, retrieved from 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cst_all.htm  
 
Although the trade between China and ASEAN countries can be viewed as mutually 
beneficial, China was gained more from trader relations than ASEAN states member. 
Even the trade surplus ASEAN states enjoy from China is decreasing. More importantly, 
China’s high-tech industries improved faster than ASEAN states because it absorbed 
most of FDI inflow to Asia. Also China’s public investment in many areas of science and 
technology contributed to China high-tech advantage over ASEAN. Indeed, this can even 
be viewed as an unfair advantage. 
 
Regional and sub-regional economic cooperation between China and ASEAN 
China-ASEAN regional economic cooperation deepened with the ‘Framework 
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation’ signed in 2002 that established 
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ASEAN-China free trade area. ACFTA was realized in the beginning of 2010 and area 
includes Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
China. In 2015, the area will be extended to Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Viet Nam. 
The tariff will be zero for more than 90% of the products by 2015 in China-ASEAN free 
trade area. China’s exports to ASEAN are expected to increase by 55.1% and ASEAN’s 
export to China should increase by 48% (Cheng-Chwee 2005, 110). The Chinese 
government also signed ‘ACFTA Investment Agreement’ in 2009 to further consolidate 
China-ASEAN economic cooperation. China promised to establish 10 billion US dollars 
to the ‘China-ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund’, mainly for the investment on 
infrastructure, energy, and information technology industries, and offered 15 billion 
credits ready to support ASEAN states20. 
In addition to ACFTA, China also utilized sub-regional economic strategies to deepen 
China-ASEAN economic cooperation. One strategy is “One axis and two wings”. This 
idea was initially proposed by Liu Qibao, secretary of the CPC (Communist Party of 
China) Guangxi Committee, in 2006 for a local/provincial economic development. Then 
the Chinese central government adopted this idea and expanded the development strategy 
to include ASEAN states. One axis is to establish transport infrastructure, such as 
                                                      
20 See China-ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund Establishing 2009; Premier Wen Jiabao 
Attends the 12th China-ASEAN Summit 2009. 
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railways and highways, from China’s Nan Ning city to Singapore through Hanoi, Phnom 
Penh (Cambodia’s Capital), Bangkok (Thailand’s Capital), Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia’s 
Capital), forming an economic corridor through southern China and Southeast Asia. 
The two wings are Pan Beibu Gulf economic zone and Great Mekong Sub-region 
(GMS) economic cooperation. Pan Beibu Gulf economic zone extends from Beibu gulf 
that only covers Chinese Guanxi and Vietnam to Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, 
Philippines, and Brunei. Basically, the Pan Beibu Gulf economic zone is designed to 
increase sea transportation routes, exploit and share the resources around Pan Beibu Gulf 
that will facilitate economic activities among China and ASEAN states around the region. 
The Great Mekong Sub-region economic cooperation involves all the countries connected 
with the Mekong River such as Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, and 
Southern China. The Mekong River is the only river passing through all six states. The 
Asian Development Bank originally funded the GMS in 1992. However, due to the 
shortage of funds and unclear policy goals, the GMS program did not develop well until 
China took an active role in supporting the GMS in order to intensify China-ASEAN 
economic relationship. In ‘Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Co-Operation Between ASEAN and the People's Republic of China’ signed in 2002, 
Mekong river development is listed in one of the five priority sectors to strengthen 
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economic cooperation21. China urged the construction of railways and highways linking 
Chinese and ASEAN commercial cities. In the 3rd GMS economic cooperation 
conference in 2008, Chinese premier minister Wen Jiabao proposed enhancing 
China-Thailand cooperation in order to accomplish Kunming-Bangkok Highway by 2011 
and to fund 20 million RMB in a bid to expedite the construction of Trans-Asian railway 
that connects China and six ASEAN states22. 
In addition to sub-regional economic strategies, China also developed bilateral 
economic relationships with individual ASEAN states. For example, China’s ‘two 
corridor and one circle’ strategy, will build two transportation systems that link Kunming 
(China) – Lao Cai (Vietnam) – Hanoi (Vietnam) – Hai Phong (Vietnam) – Quang Ninh 
(Vietnam), and Nanning – Lang Son (Vietnam) – Hanoi – Hai Phong – Quang Ninh 
respectively, further boosting economic activities between southern China and Vietnam. 
The two ‘corridors’ can also enrich the economic activities and resource development 
around Beibu Gulf economic zone. Another example of China’s bilateral economic 
cooperation is in China-Malaysia cooperation. At the China-ASEAN Summit in 2006, 
Chinese premier minister Wen Jiabao and Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi 
                                                      
21 Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between ASEAN and the 
People's Republic of China 2002. 
22 Wen Jiabao Offers Eight Proposals for GMS Economic Cooperation 2008. 
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announced a cooperative plan that Malaysia’s state-owned energy company will provide 
3.03 million tons of Liquefied Natural Gas annually over the next 25 years. This 25 
billion US dollars contract is the largest China-Malaysia deal (Storey 2006). 
With China’s activism in strengthening the infrastructure that further facilitate 
China-ASEAN economic activities, the economic ties between China and ASEAN is built 
on both multilateral and bilateral relations. These relations are meant to forge an 
economic community in East and Southeast Asia.  
 
Applicability of realism and constructivism 
According to the current trend in China-ASEAN trade relations, China-ASEAN 
economic relationship reflects a non zero-sum game more than a zero-sum game. As 
China’s economy grows the benefits are also shared with ASEAN states. According to 
strict trade figures, China imports raw materials from ASEAN member states and exports 
final goods to these countries. This presents a picture of exploitation (i.e. neo-colonialism) 
and realist zero sum game. Also, as China’s surplus earned from EU and the U.S. 
increases, ASEAN states’ surplus with China decreases. However, when one takes into 
account the broader economic policies and infrastructure investments, the China-ASEAN 
trade relation is more complementary than competitive. China did not narrowly utilize its 
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advantage to exploit ASEAN states. In addition, ASEAN states’ welcomed China’s 
sub-regional strategies. This illustrates that China’s foreign policy behavior benefits 
regional economy as well as its own welfare. Overall, China-ASEAN economic 
relationship is a non zero-sum game where both sides can obtain absolute gains. 
FDI inflow is a significant concern for ASEAN states. Some leaders of ASEAN 
member states expressed concern about China’s FDI inflow that crowded out their own 
and developmental opportunities. Also, ASEAN states feared that zero tariffs within 
ASEAN-China free trade area may harm their labor-intensive industries23. Realists may 
argue that China’s growing FDI inflow illustrates a zero-sum game within China-ASEAN 
economic relationship where China acquired the relative gains. However, China did not 
exploit their economic advantage to suppress ASEAN states’ opportunities for investment. 
There is no clear evidence to support the assumption that China is intended to squeeze 
relative gains from China-ASEAN economic cooperation. Rather, China attempted to 
compensate ASEAN states by encouraging more FDI to ASEAN member states and 
import more products from ASEAN states24. This does not reflect the realist assumptions.  
By strengthening economic ties in East Asia, China has reshaped its own foreign 
policy identity and how ASEAN member states perceive China. Realists might point out 
                                                      
23 Ministry of Commerce Encourages Investment in ASEAN 2010. 
24 Ministry of Commerce Encourages Investment in ASEAN 2010. 
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that sub-regional economic strategy is just a way for China to enhance its economic 
influence on ASEAN states, and eventually dominate the regional economy. The logic 
behind cooperation is sill realist. However, the key point is that China’s economic interest 
is more regional (community)-based than strictly selfish; China’s foreign economic 
policies took into consideration regional economic security rather than its own narrow 
economic security interests. For example, during financial crises in 1997 and 2008, China 
did not adopt beggar-thy-neighbor policy or protectionism to save its economy at the 
expense of others. Rather, it enhanced investment and cooperation with ASEAN states. 
China’s understanding of economic security is increasingly cooperative with ASEAN. 
Therefore, constructivism is more applicable than realism to explain the development of 
China-ASEAN economic relationship. 
 
Institutional Power 
South China Sea dispute 
Spratly islands dispute is a true test of ASEAN’s institutional power. The key point is 
whether China and ASEAN states can resolve this sensitive dispute through multilateral 
dialogues rather than military confrontation. The Spratly islands in South China Sea are a 
collection of coral reefs, atolls and sand bars covering seventy thousand square miles, 
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whose sovereignty is partly or wholly claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, 
Brunei and the Philippines (Dosch 2008, 164). Initially, China refused to deal with the 
sovereignty controversy on Spratly Islands through multilateral negotiations and stated 
that China will only deal with other sovereign nations bilaterally. Even it signed the 1996 
UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), which is an international law 
allowing states to address sea disputes multilaterally (Jones & Smith 2007, 177). In 2002, 
China signed the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea that 
reaffirmed UNCLOS, ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and China’s 
five principles of peaceful coexistence25 (Jones & Smith 2007, 178). However, in 1994, 
China formally became a full participant of the ARF and began to attend the annual ARF 
meeting, symbolizing the beginning of multilateral dialogues between China and ASEAN 
states (Cheng-Chwee 2005, 103). In 2003, China signed the TAC that stresses the 
principle of nonintervention on ASEAN members’ internal affairs26 (Jones & Smith 2007, 
178). This suggests that China’s posture toward multilateral dialogue over the Spratly 
islands changed from awareness to acceptance. In 1994, China was not willing to discuss 
                                                      
25 The Five Principles are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual 
non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and 
peaceful coexistence. Chinese former Premier Zhou Enlai set the principles ensuring the 
diplomatic attitude to the relations between China and India in Tibet. Afterward, The Five 
Principles became China’s substantial rules to engage other states. See Five principles of peaceful 
coexistence. 
26 See Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Bali, 24 February 1976. 
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Spratly islands dispute in the ARF meeting (Evans 2003, 748). In the 1997 ARF meeting, 
China accepted a motion to discuss this problem multilaterally for the first time (Evans 
2003, 752). In 2000 the ARF meeting, China initiated ‘Regional Code of Conduct in the 
South China Sea’, which offers joint development in this area (Evans 2003, 753). To sum 
up, China’s foreign policy toward Spratly Islands veered from bilateralism to 
multilateralism where the problem of Spratly Islands was discussed among related parties 
collectively after its signature of the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea and TAC (Jones & Smith 2007, 178). 
Despite of China’s friendly posture toward South China Sea dispute, it is still doubtful 
that China will fully abide by the ASEAN Way to resolve this dispute. Jones and Smith 
suggest that China just utilized the nonintervention principle to exclude America’s 
involvement by treating Spratly Islands as a neighborhood watch issue (Jones & Smith 
2007, 179). In addition, China also used nonintervention principle to support Taiwan 
sovereignty issue that China considers as an internal affair (Jones & Smith 2007, 179). 
Thus, China’s approach to multilateral security retains a strong unilateral intention. 
Furthermore, the rising military presence of several countries in the South China Sea 
suggests the limited function of the ARF to resolve territorial disputes. Several ASEAN 
member states and China have attempted to enhance their military power in South China 
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Sea. Reportedly, China dispatched five naval vessels and two submarines to South China 
Sea in early 2008 (Mitton 2008) and deployed new navy patrols in the South China Sea 
on April 2010 (Richardson 2010). Vietnam recently purchased six Russian-made Kilo 
submarines and 12 Sukhoi Su-30MK2 jet fighters. This is the largest military acquisition 
since the end of Vietnam War and this expanded Vietnam’s military power in the South 
China Sea (Torode & M. Chan 2009). Malaysian Defense Minister Ahmad Zahid said 
that Malaysia would acquire more submarines to maintain Malaysia’s presence in South 
China Sea and India Ocean27.  
It also appears that China is still reluctant to resolve the South China Sea dispute 
through multilateral dialogue. Vietnam, who has the fiercest dispute with China on South 
China Sea problem, is the rotating chair of ASEAN in 2010 and will hold ASEAN 
Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) in Hanoi on October 2010. China 
privately warned Vietnam that if Vietnamese government insists on discussing the South 
China Sea problem in ADMM Plus, China will not participate this meeting (Qiu 2010). 
One senior official within ASEAN reacted to the Chinese official statement with dismay 
and said that the statement is a denial of ASEAN states’ right to discuss security issues 
(Qiu 2010). Vietnamese representative stressed that discussing the South China Sea 
                                                      
27 Malaysian DM: Malaysia may acquire more submarines 2009. 
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dispute is not ASEAN states’ collective opposition against China, but rather a way to 
resolve dispute peacefully (Qiu 2010). Therefore, China’s agreement on TAC and 
multilateral dialogue are not consistent with its current foreign policy behavior. China 
was still aware of multilateral dialogue as a way to deal with sensitive sovereignty 
problem. 
 
China’s influence in ASEAN institution 
1997 and 2008 financial crises consolidated the institutionalization of economic and 
financial cooperation between China and ASEAN. During the 1997 East Asian financial 
crisis, the economies that suffered the most serious damage (mainly South Korea, 
Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia) needed immediate financial aid, but America was 
reluctant to directly help them. China, as a relatively unaffected state made a bold 
decision - refuse to devalue its currency (Kurlantzick 2007, 69). These wrecked 
economies appreciated China’s decision because China did not narrowly benefit itself at 
the expense of the Southeast Asian nations (Kurlantzick 2007, 69). With the lack of 
immediate U.S. action, ASEAN countries turned to aggrandize ASEAN’s function and 
expand the organization in order to ensure their future economic security (Kurlantzick 
2007, 70). By the end of 1997, China, South Korea, and Japan were invited to participate 
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the first ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit with the commitment to multilateral 
cooperation and enhance economic integration. Despite some early misgivings of 
multilateral diplomacy, China was gradually played a substantial role to bolster the 
multilateral system in ASEAN and proposed some initiatives contributing to regional 
economic stability, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI)28 in 2000 and the proposal 
for joint Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Japan and South Korea (Gilson 2006, 222). 
The APT has also contributed to the regional economy greatly as well. For example, the 
currency swap arrangements in APT built an important financial reserve that could 
prevent from serious monetary shortage. By early 2004, the cumulative value of these 
swap arrangements reached $36.5 billion (Gilson 2006, 209). In addition, China strongly 
backed Malaysia’s initiative to expand APT’s scale to include security issues by 
establishing East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2004 (Simon 2008, 209). China and ASEAN 
signed ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) agreement in 2004 that created the 
largest free-trade zone in terms of population in 2010. Due to China’s active participation 
and contribution, ASEAN has linked its economic future with its relation with China 
                                                      
28 Chiang Mai Initiative aimed at initiating further cooperation on monitoring capital flows and 
building swap networks in order to prevent from the re-occurrence of financial crisis aroused 
from uncontrolled capital flows. In response to the global financial crisis occurred in September 
2008, China, Japan, and South Korea made a commitment to expand the swap lines in a bid to 
deepen Chiang Mai Initiative and stabilize regional financial and economic order. See The Joint 
Ministerial Statement of the ASEAN + 3 Finance Ministers Meeting; Towards a co-ordinated 
macroeconomic expansion among Asian economies 2008. 
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(Gilson 2006, 222).  
The 2008 global financial crisis is also a significant event that highlights China’s 
monetary status in this region.  In 2008, the American financial crisis erupted and sent 
shock waves throughout the world economy. The significant decline in American 
consumption caused a dramatic drop in East and Southeast Asian exports to the U.S. In 
response, China, South Korea and Japan announced an expansion of the currency swap 
arrangement based on the Chiang Mai Initiative in order to prevent the collapse of 
regional economies. By the end of 2009, China, Japan, South Korea and ASEAN states 
signed Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) agreement that offered 120 
billion US dollars to bolster regional currencies. China and Japan contributed 32% each 
of total amount respectively (together they covered 64%), South Korea provided 16%, 
and ASEAN states supplied the remainder29. It is possible that China and Japan had their 
own interest in dominating the fund for the Chiang Mai Initiative. However, Japan 
remains the leading investor in development funds. Japan’s capital in the IMF and Asian 
Development Bank is much higher than China. Japan maintains 6.2% of capital in IMF 
and 12.9% in ADB, while China has only 3.8% in IMF and 5.5% in ADB (Changxun 
2009). China’s capital in CMIM reserve pool is currently equal to Japan’s capital, and this 
                                                      
29 Asian Foreign-exchange Reserve Pool Signed 2009. 
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appears to be a successful attempt by China to undermine Japan’s regional institutional 
influence (Changxun 2009). 
China’s large contribution to the joint foreign reserve pool enhances China’s 
institutional power in ASEAN. This not only reflects China’s influence in the economic 
realm, but also demonstrates China’s role in building institutions and establishing norms. 
While announcing to build foreign reserve pool jointly, Chinese prime minister Wen 
Jiabao said that ASEAN Plus One (China), ASEAN Plus Three, and East Asia Summit 
have created a good basis for East Asia community30. Chinese foreign ministry also said 
that shaping East Asia community is the future direction of boosting East Asian 
cooperation 31 . This is the first time Chinese prime minister mentions East Asia 
community publicly. In previous ASEAN meetings, what members mentioned is ASEAN 
community rather than East Asia community. This implies that China is using its 
economic power and new confidence to influence the regional order and institutional 
power as well as shaping ASEAN’s norms and rules. Thus it is possible that China is 
shaping ASEAN’s institutions rather than socialized into ASEAN’s norms. 
Another example is the 2nd APT summit. China took the lead to organize the financial 
meetings where the deputy governors of APT central banks regularly discuss financial 
                                                      
30 ASEAN community and East Asia community 2009. 
31 ASEAN community and East Asia community 2009. 
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cooperation. China used the APT as a platform to boost East Asian cooperation as well as 
to enhance its influence in regional order (Cheng-Chwee 2005, 109). 
Although China’s initiatives contribute to regional cooperation, China tried to control 
the direction for its own national benefit. The negotiation over East Asia Summit (EAS)’s 
membership is an example.  The EAS was a Malaysian proposal that tried to extend 
cooperative issues from economic agenda to “security, democracy, good government, the 
rule of law, every aspect of human security.” (Simon 2008, 209) China strongly supported 
Malaysian proposal to exclude the U.S. from EAS (Simon 2008, 209). However, the EAS 
still included some of America’s allies—New Zealand, Australia, and India because other 
East Asian countries feared China’s potential domination in this region (Simon 2008, 
209).  
 
Applicability of realism and constructivism 
While China is enthusiastically involved in ASEAN institutions and proposed 
constructive initiatives, realist behavior is still embedded in China’s cooperative 
engagement with ASEAN states. China is gradually willing to discuss security issues on a 
multilateral basis in ARF, but it is still reluctant to address South China Sea dispute in 
ARF. Superficially, China respects multilateral mechanism, but privately resists 
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multilateral dialogue in sensitive cases. Like the case mentioned above, China privately 
warned Vietnam not to list South China Sea dispute in ADMM agenda and otherwise 
China will not attend the ADMM Plus meeting (Qiu 2010). Furthermore, China did not 
publicly oppose the U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia, and even supported U.S. 
presence in this region. In the process of forging regional community, however, China 
managed to cautiously exclude the U.S. influence from Southeast Asia. China’s support 
for Malaysia’s EAS proposal to exclude the U.S. alliance is a case in point. 
It is undeniable that China’s engagement with ASEAN states was becoming more 
cooperative than before, but it is also attempting to ensure that cooperation is under 
China’s control without undermining its core interests. Despite China’s increasing 
participation and cooperation in ASEAN-led institutions, China’s vigilance against 
ASEAN’s united stance on traditional security issues such as South China Sea issue and 
U.S. indirect containment did not diminish. Indeed, within the realm of sovereignty issues, 
China is still more concerned with the relative gains of regional states and America.  
Nevertheless, China is playing a greater role in developing regional cooperation by 
encouraging mutual benefits (i.e. absolute gains) rather than narrowly supporting 
traditional security and a zero-sum outcomes (i.e. relative gains). The “Framework 
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation” between China and ASEAN in 
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2002 encouraged Japan and South Korea to build closer institutional relationships with 
ASEAN. ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership was signed in April 2008, 
while the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation was signed 
by South Korea and ASEAN in December 2005. During 1997 financial crisis, China’s 
decision not to depreciate RMB won Southeast Asian states’ trust, stepping up 
China-ASEAN institutional relationship. After 2008 global financial crisis, China was 
expected to play a greater role in the economic recovery amid the disappointment with 
the U.S. power. Indeed, China’s participation further strengthened East Asian regional 
economic cooperation.  The extension of CMIM is a case in point. 
Yet, realism is not a more appropriate explanation than constructivism in 
China-ASEAN institutional relationship rather it is part of the mix and complexity of this 
relationship. Neither realism nor constructivism can fully explain China-ASEAN 
relationship. Admittedly, ASEAN did socialize China into the international community to 
some extent, decreasing fears associated with multilateral security issues in ARF and 
increasing its willingness to strengthen cooperation in many ways. However, there was 
limited change in China’s regional identity.  Suspicions of ASEAN’s united stance with 
the U.S. as well as possible US containment policy against China remained. China 
attempted to influence ASEAN institutions in favor of its own interests while rhetorically 
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supporting ASEAN’s pivotal role in regional cooperation32. China’s foreign behavior 
toward ASEAN institutions relfects realist intentions; China tried to enhance its relative 
gains to acquire a dominant position in ASEAN. To sum up, both constructivism and 
realism can partly explain China-ASEAN institutional relationship; China was socialized 
by ASEAN to some extent, but its realist intentions remain.  
 
Part IV. Conclusions 
Realism and constructivism have different explanatory power regarding the 
China-ASEAN military, economic, and institutional relationships. In military relationship, 
constructivism is more applicable than realism. China’s military posture toward 
multilateral institution, ARF, changed from vigilant to acceptance. Protecting regional 
non-traditional security is the main purpose for military cooperation in Southeast Asia 
and therefore military cooperation is less zero-sum than non zero-sum game in this area.  
Many non-traditional security issues in ARF also eased China’s awareness to cooperate 
with ASEAN states. Also, frequent joint anti-terrorist military exercises between the U.S. 
                                                      
32 China’s official talk shows it takes ASEAN as a pivotal role in regional cooperation. For 
example, Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao said, “China consistently supports ASEAN's leading 
role in regional affairs and regional cooperation…We should keep close coordination and 
cooperation on major regional and international issues and ensure that ASEAN remain at the core 
of East Asia cooperation and that 10 + 3 serve as the main vehicle in East Asia cooperation.” See 
Full text of Premier Wen Jiabao's speech at China-ASEAN summit 2006.  
62 
 
and ASEAN states did not arouse China’s suspicions. 
In institutional relationship, both constructivism and realism are applicable. 
Constructivism explains why China became more comfortable in engaging with ASEAN 
states via multilateral dialogues in ASEAN-led institutions. China-ASEAN cooperation 
through these institutions became more solid and intensive. Compared with China’s 
previous experience with ASEAN institutions in the 1990s, China’s foreign policy 
behavior towards international institutions also changed, from distrust to acceptance. 
However, realism explains China’s intention to extend its role through institutional 
cooperation in order to reduce US influence in the region. Moreover, although 
China-ASEAN military relationship were eased in the  non-traditional security areas and 
cooperation, traditional security – South China Sea dispute – presents significant 
challenges to the cooperative mechanism in ARF.  Even though China accepted the 
multilateral mechanism in ARF, such as CBMs and preventative diplomacy publicly, 
China still managed not to discuss South China Sea issue on a multilateral basis. 
Therefore, China is only partially socialized into ASEAN-led institutions.  While 
China’s foreign policy behavior becomes more cooperative and moderate, some realist 




Still, constructivism is more applicable than realism when explaining the 
China-ASEAN economic relationship. China-ASEAN economic relationship is a 
non-zero sum game. The more China’s economy grows the more benefits ASEAN states 
can share. Although FDI inflow to China tends to crowd out FDI inflow to ASEAN 
member states, China attempts to compensate ASEAN states through greater Chinese 
investment and cooperation in ASEAN states.  This does not reflect realist behavior. 
Furthermore, China’s identity is closely tied to domestic and regional economic 
development is significant factor in regional economic cooperation. China’s sub-regional 
economic strategy is based on the understanding of collective economic security rather 
than narrow economic security issues. Compared to China’s economic development 
based on autarky in the past, China’s regional identity changed. 
Overall, it is hard to apply either realism or constructivism to explain the development 
of China-ASEAN relations. The relationship between China and ASEAN is complex and 
dynamic.  Therefore, it is important to examine issue specific explanations of 
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